G7 Special Webpage 2026

G7 Environment Ministers' Meeting

Nanda Kumar JANARDHANAN

Climate Change Deputy Director

Rethinking Critical Minerals Beyond Supply Security

Critical minerals are seen as the ‘new oil’ due to the political and strategic importance they enjoy in the global economy. Because they are essential for both the clean energy transition and strategic defence industries, securing their supply has become a security priority for countries.

As demand increases, growing geopolitical tensions among countries often spill over into the trade of critical minerals, jeopardising supply chains. The dominance of a few players in supply partly explains why importing countries tend to view critical minerals largely from a supply security perspective. For example, most of the supply growth for nickel is from Indonesia, while many other critical minerals are dominated by China. In this context, the 297th meeting of the IEA Governing Board at Ministerial Level highlighted the security dynamics ingrained in critical mineral supply chains and stressed the importance of a mineral security programme. However, several international initiatives and platforms have already pointed to the need to examine various often overlooked aspects of the critical mineral value chain. The key question is whether the G7 can take a renewed look at the global critical mineral market, not only from a supply security perspective, but from the perspective of the wider implications of the critical mineral value chain.

A few facts are worth noting. The IEA points out that lithium demand surged by about 30%, far above the 2010s average of 10%, while nickel, cobalt, graphite, and rare earths grew by 6–8% in 2024. This trend indicates a surge in new mining and exploration activities. Some of the underlying concerns relate to the broader challenge of ensuring responsible and sustainable critical mineral value chains, including environmental impacts on water, land, agriculture, and livelihoods in resource-rich economies. These are issues that reflect long-standing debates on conflict minerals, especially human rights and environmental due diligence, and trade linked to harmful production practices. Weaker governance and poor environmental safeguards further expose local and indigenous populations to these adverse impacts.

Although supply security and geopolitical challenges often dominate discussions research reveals the extent of damage of these underlying issues. For instance, one study indicates that mining contaminates up to 1.8 million km of rivers worldwide (5% of the total), with over 18% located in conservation priority areas, while another shows that mining-induced deforestation accounted for 19,765 km² between 2001 and 2023, significantly higher than earlier estimates. These impacts on society, and ecosystems suggest that viewing critical minerals solely as a supply security issue requires a fundamental reassessment. In this context, the T7 Taskforce under the G7 has emphasised the importance of addressing challenges across the critical mineral value chain in coordination with both leading producer nations and consumers. The T7 solution paper highlights this and stresses the need to build bridges between the G7 and G20 as a key step in this process.

André MADER

Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services Principal Policy Researcher /
Strategic Management Office Principal Networking Coordinator

Biodiversity Finance, Desertification and the G7 Nature Compact Progress Review

The G7 Environment Ministers’ Meeting held in Paris on 23–24 April 2026, under the French Presidency, produced seven joint declarations spanning biodiversity finance, desertification, ocean governance, water resources, circular economy, pollution and infrastructure resilience (G7 French Presidency, 2026a). Three specific outcomes are explored here:

• • the launch of the Nature and People Finance Alliance as a new vehicle for biodiversity finance;
• • the elevation of desertification and land degradation to the status of security-relevant systemic challenges; and
• • the ongoing progress review of the 2021 G7 Nature Compact.

Biodiversity Finance and the Nature and People Finance Alliance
Perhaps the most significant outcome of the meeting was the launch of the Nature and People Finance Alliance, a French Presidency initiative designed to strengthen coordination between public and private financial actors and to scale up funding for nature conservation and restoration (G7 French Presidency, 2026b). The Alliance is framed as a mechanism to bring “greater coherence and strategic direction to existing efforts” while leveraging “increased voluntary private sector engagement”. Notably, rather than proposing a new fund, France has opted for an inclusive, coalition-based model designed to aggregate different funding streams under one umbrella.

The Alliance is a French Presidency initiative, formally launched at the meeting as a means to bring "greater coherence and strategic direction to existing efforts" while leveraging "increased voluntary private sector engagement" (G7 French Presidency, 2026b). It draws on Think7 (T7), the official G7 engagement group that channels recommendations from global think tanks and research institutions to G7 leaders. The T7 Task Force on Biodiversity Finance produced a paper on "Standardising and Strengthening Accountability for Biodiversity Finance," which identified the lack of comparable methodologies across public and private biodiversity finance as a central barrier to effective resource mobilisation (Think7, 2026). The paper frames biodiversity loss as an economic and financial risk, drawing on IPBES assessments to argue that the value of nature must be integrated into economic decision-making through aligned reporting standards, nature-positive investment incentives, and interoperable taxonomies for public finance (IPBES, 2026; Think7, 2026).

The gap between biodiversity finance requirements and actual delivery still falls far short of what has been said to be necessary to meet the targets of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF). The Alliance’s emphasis on “locally-led approaches” and its embrace of both the public and private sector is welcome, but its effectiveness may ultimately depend on whether it can move beyond convening power and toward measurable, additional capital mobilisation—and whether that requires resorting to regulatory mandates.

Desertification, Land Degradation and the Security Nexus
The second landmark outcome was the formal classification of desertification, land degradation and drought as “systemic environmental, economic, social and security challenges of global concern” with implications for security risk (G7 French Presidency, 2026c). The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) has long considered land degradation as a driver of conflict and displacement. The G7 adoption of language like “systemic global concern”, however, raises the status of these issues. This may have implications for how restoration programmes are funded and governed—potentially opening the door to expanded government intervention and resource transfers.

Multiple reports have noted that France excluded climate change from the formal agenda to avoid confrontation with the United States and to preserve G7 unity (Reuters, 2026; Le Monde, 2026, The Japan Times, 2026). According to The Japan Times, French Minister for Ecological Transition Monique Barbut stated that France “chose to focus on areas that would attract consensus among all G7 members rather than provoke divisions”. In this light, the desertification agenda can be seen as serving a dual function: advancing an important environmental and humanitarian issue while also providing a politically safe space for collective action that might otherwise have been derailed by disagreements over climate language.

All eyes now turn to the next meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UNCCD (UNCCD COP17), scheduled to take place in Ulaanbaatar from 17 to 28 August 2026 under the theme “Restoring Land. Restoring Hope.” The G7 declaration identified UNCCD COP17 as a critical juncture and test for the credibility of the Paris commitments—though history suggests such multilateral pledges frequently falter when confronted with implementation realities and sovereign priorities.

The G7 Nature Compact Progress Review
Central to the 2026 G7 environment track was the five-year review of the G7 2030 Nature Compact. The Compact, adopted at the Cornwall G7 Summit in June 2021, committed leaders to halting and reversing biodiversity loss by 2030 across four pillars: transition, investment, conservation and accountability (G7 UK Presidency, 2021).

UNEP was commissioned to assess collective progress toward the Compact's commitments, mapping actions, achievements, and obstacles across each thematic area without conducting individual country assessments. The review's analytical framework integrates biodiversity, climate and pollution dimensions in line with UNEP's "triple planetary crisis" framing, drawing on the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework.

UNEP's preliminary findings were presented at the G7 Environment Ministers' Meeting in Paris, with the full report expected to inform the G7 Leaders' Summit in Évian (15–17 June). The Compact set targets which, five years on, remain far from being achieved. There is a considerable gap between aspiration in the Compact and implementation and, if the review is clear about that gap, it could serve as a powerful accountability mechanism. If it is overly diplomatic, it risks becoming another exercise in aspirational language without consequence.

Concluding Assessment
The meeting in April demonstrated that meaningful multilateral environmental cooperation remains possible even under conditions of geopolitical strain and scepticism toward multilateral environmental governance. The three strands examined here — biodiversity finance, desertification and the Nature Compact review — each represent potential policy advances. However, each also carries the familiar vulnerability of distance between declaration and delivery. The Nature and People Finance Alliance must demonstrate additionality through private sector engagement. The desertification agenda must survive the transition from G7 communiqué to UNCCD COP17 negotiating text. The Évian Leaders' Summit in June and UNCCD COP17 in August may give an early indication of whether the Paris outcomes carry institutional weight — or follow the more familiar trajectory of ambition without traction.

Ngoc-Bao PHAM

Sustainable Consumption and Production Research Director

G7 Action on Water Pollution: Priority Pollutants and Practical Solutions

Water is a precious resource that links climate change, human health, biodiversity loss, and economic security. At the same time, it serves as a conduit for the accumulating by-products of modern industrial society. Scientific advances have identified a growing array of contaminants, including so-called “forever chemicals”, such as per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), microplastics, pharmaceutical residues, nanoparticles, and agricultural runoff. [p2.1]These emerging pollutants are intensified by extreme weather events, often resist conventional treatment processes, and can accumulate in food chains over decades. These pollutants do not exist in isolation. They often coexist with persistent, and even far more pervasive, challenges rooted in inadequate basic sanitation and wastewater infrastructure.

Industrial discharges, urban sewage, agricultural runoff, and untreated domestic effluents remain the dominant water-quality threats across much of the developing world. According to a recent UN-Water report, fewer than 5% of domestic and urban wastewater streams were safely treated in 2022 prior to discharge into the environment in more than 30 low-income countries (UN-Water, 2024). Globally, SDG Progress Report 2024 data show that proportion of domestic wastewater that is safely treated was 56 per cent in 2022 (no change since 2020) (United Nations, 2025). In lower-income countries, agricultural runoff continues to pose the most acute pollution risk, compounded by the absence of functional treatment systems. These structural deficits reinforce the importance of integrated, systems-based approaches to water pollution management that address both conventional pollutants and emerging chemical threats, rather than treating each in isolation.

Furthermore, the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2026 highlights five major environmental challenges, including extreme weather events, biodiversity loss, critical changes to Earth systems, natural resource shortages, and pollution, among the top ten long-term global risks. These converging pressures have informed the French Presidency’s decision to prioritise water pollution within the 2026 G7 environment track.

What the G7 Discussions Achieved
The 2026 French G7 Presidency is commendable for anchoring water pollution, particularly its emerging pollutants, at the center of the environment track and sustaining a focused dialogue across seven Senior Officials’ Meetings (SOMs). Building on the G7 Water Coalition launched under Italy’s 2024 Presidency, and the three-year Workplan (2025–2028) endorsed at the 2025 Toronto G7 Energy and Environment Ministers’ Meeting, the final communiqué, formally entitled "Initiative on G7 Water Coalition Action to Address Water Pollution" articulates a clear and unified direction. It affirms the G7's "shared determination to prevent pollution at source, and to conserve, protect, sustainably manage and restore water resources and aquatic ecosystems," while also recognising "interconnections and co-benefits between water, energy, food, ecosystems and long-term prosperity". Importantly, the text acknowledges that "water pollution, including plastic and chemical pollution, such as PFAS, constitutes a challenge for many governments, public authorities and stakeholders in the water sector worldwide" and notes that "the burden associated with water pollution can be significant". This recognition obviously strengthens the policy basis for coordinated international action on emerging pollutants.

From Commitments to Implementation: Key Actors and Mechanisms
While the G7’s political commitments are strong, translating them into practice will require a clear assignment of responsibilities and the mobilisation of existing implementation tools. Several actors are central to this transition. National environmental regulators and health agencies must operationalise monitoring frameworks and enforce discharge standards. Municipal and utility authorities, particularly in urban settings, are the primary service-delivery entities responsible for wastewater treatment and infrastructure investment.

A range of implementation instruments already exists and can be further strengthened within the G7 framework. Regulatory measures include national drinking-water standards for PFAS compounds: the United States EPA finalised enforceable maximum limits for drinking water in 2025, and the European Union is advancing a near-total ban on PFAS under REACH 2.0. Market-based instruments, including the polluter-pays principle and extended producer responsibility (EPR) schemes, can internalise the costs of chemical pollution across value chains. In addition, information-based instruments, including a knowledge-sharing platform, a public database of PFAS-producing facilities, and voluntary agreements to share monitoring results, would enhance comparability and transparency at relatively low cost. The G7 Water Coalition Workplan (2025–2028) explicitly promotes such regulatory and incentive-based mechanisms as core modalities for advancing water-quality commitments.

Nonetheless, key barriers to implementing the above measures effectively on the ground must also be addressed. In many countries, particularly in the Global South, financial constraints, limited laboratory capacity, and data gaps hinder effective monitoring and regulation. Capacity constraints at both the regulatory and utility levels may delay the translation of G7 norms into national policy. These risks underline why the G7’s engagement should extend beyond standard-setting towards enabling capacity-building, technology transfer, and targeted financial support for developing nations.

In addition, the commitment to convene a joint Innovation Day on Water, co-hosted by the G7 and G20 Presidencies later this year, represents a tangible operational step forward, designed to showcase promising approaches and technologies to enhance water security.

Discussions at the recent SOMs also underscored water as a priority for the G20 this year, with active coordination underway. Several countries voiced strong support and highlighted rising concern about PFAS, reinforcing the need for strengthened international cooperation. Together, these signals help set the course toward the December 2026 UN Water Conference.

Forward-Looking Recommendations

• (i) Establishing a PFAS Knowledge Platform
  As the December 2026 UN Water Conference approaches, the G7 should move beyond political recognition toward concrete operational commitments. One practical early deliverable would be the establishment of a dedicated knowledgesharing platform on PFAS. Such a platform could consolidate evidence on key health effects, support the development of methodologies for deriving health-based guidance values for individual PFAS compounds and mixtures, and promote the identification of safer alternatives. In parallel, voluntary data-sharing agreements on PFAS monitoring standards would enhance comparability, transparency, and policy coherence across jurisdictions.
• (ii) Aligning with the Global Framework on Chemicals and the UN Water Conference
  Two global frameworks provide critical anchors for the G7’s water pollution agenda, each operating at a distinct level and with a different function. First, the Global Framework on Chemicals (GFC), adopted in Bonn in September 2023, functions primarily as a technical and operational framework. It aims to improve understanding of the sources, environmental pathways, and exposure risks associated with hazardous chemicals, including PFAS compounds and their mixtures, while advancing measures to mitigate their impacts on human health and ecosystems. It provides the scientific and methodological foundation for translating G7 commitments into actionable chemical management regimes, offering a vehicle for harmonizing standards across the G7 and engaging non-G7 governments and industry partners. Meanwhile, the UN 2026 Water Conference can be another complementary framework. Its mandate is to accelerate the implementation of SDG 6 and elevate water on the global multilateral agenda. Unlike the GFC, which operates through a specialized chemicals governance process, the UN Water Conference engages a wider range of stakeholders and can generate the political momentum needed to close financing and regulatory gaps that no single actor can address alone.
• (iii) Designing the Innovation Day on Water as an Inclusive Platform
  The proposed Innovation Day on Water, to be co-convened by the G7 and G20 Presidencies in 2026, should be understood as a targeted inter-governmental initiative that is both distinct from and complementary to existing UN water observances. It is expected that the Innovation Day will not merely be a technology showcase for advanced economies, but as an inclusive platform for enabling technology transfer, knowledge exchange, and the deployment of scalable solutions tailored to developing-country contexts.
• (iv) Aligning with SDG 6 and the INC on Plastic Pollution
  Furthermore, these efforts should be explicitly aligned with Sustainable Development Goals, particularly SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation, and connected to ongoing negotiations under the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Plastic Pollution. Such alignment would ensure coherence across global environmental governance frameworks and maximize policy impact.

IGES Engagement in the Asia-Pacific
IGES has extensive practical experience and a long track record in providing technical and policy development support for water and wastewater management, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. For example, IGES has implemented as a series of capacity development programmes for local governments across ASEAN countries on decentralised wastewater management, recognising that decentralised systems offer cost-effective and community-appropriate pathways to improving water quality in rapidly developing contexts. IGES also contributes to comparative policy analysis on water governance, drawing on its network of national and sub-national government partners across the Asia region.

Looking ahead, IGES will continue to monitor the implementation of the 2026 G7 water commitments, including assessing whether the Innovation Day delivers on its stated objectives, particularly in relation to technology transfer and international collaboration. Ahead of and following the December 2026 UN Water Conference, IGES will contribute with analytical insights to inform deliberations across its six interactive dialogues, with a particular focus on water quality, financing for water infrastructure, and the enabling conditions for equitable deployment of water technologies in Asia and the Pacific.

In parallel, IGES will continue supporting national and local governments, across Asia and the Pacific, by translating global commitments into actionable policies, institutional frameworks, and local-level implementation strategies. Through its comparative policy research programme and its convening role in regional fora, IGES is well placed to serve as a bridge between the aspirations set at the global level and the practical realities faced by governments and communities across the Asia-Pacific region.

REFERENCES
UN-Water (2024). Progress on Wastewater Treatment: 2024 Update (SDG Indicator 6.3.1). Available at: https://www.unwater.org/publications/progress-wastewater-treatment-2024-update
United Nations (2025). Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals - Report of the Secretary-General. General Assembly Economic and Social Council. Available on:https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/files/report/2025/secretary-general-sdg-report-2025--EN.pdf